An international team of ethicists refresh the debate about human enhancement by examining whether resistance to the use of technology to enhance our mental and physical capabilities can be supported by articulated philosophical reasoning, or explained away, e.g. in terms of psychological influences on moral reasoning.

Summary Canfield and Lehrer argued in [1] that it is impossible to predict an event deductively from given laws and initial conditions. In [2] I showed (1) that there are counterexamples to C&L's claim, (2) that their argument was based on an assumption which they failed to recognize, let alone support (the assumption that there are ‘rejectible’ facts), (3) that if certain simple conditions on predictability were granted, it could be shown that C&L's tacit assumption is false. In a recent (...) issue of this Journal Dr. Harnatt has criticized (3) (ignoring (1) and (2)), and he has concluded that we should still wonder whether there are any deductive predictions. Dr. Harnatt's arguments are shown to be defective. (shrink)

We report on the small-scale (0.5 13 h - 1M, a large-scale bias of ~2.0 and a satellite fraction of 12 ± 2 per cent. Thus, these galaxies occupy haloes with average masses in between those of the higher redshift BOSS CMASS sample and the original SDSS I/II luminous red galaxy sample © 2012 The Authors Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society © doi:10.1093/mnras/sts314.

Using Coffa's paper as a point of departure, this brief note is designed to show that Hempel's inductive-statistical model of explanation implicitly construes explanations of that type as defective deductive-nomological explanations, with the consequence that there is no such thing as genuine inductive-statistical explanation according to Hempel's account. This result suggests a possible implicit commitment to determinism behind Hempel's theory of scientific explanation.

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Enaction and neurophenomenology are indeed appropriate and productive theoretical and methodological tools for studying perception. But moving from the perceptual domain to the hallucinatory and dreaming domain with these tools requires a prior careful examination of the similarities and differences across these domains. The authors point in the right direction for studying dream (...) experience, but underestimate the objective and subjective differences between domains, producing thereby both an unwarranted blurring of their boundaries and an unnecessary explanatory burden on the approach defended. (shrink)

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the (...) particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann, Mostowski, and more recently Gödel, who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model. (shrink)

There is a strong need to connect agricultural research to social movements and community-based food system reform efforts. Participatory research methods are a powerful tool, increasingly used to give voice to communities overlooked by academia or marginalized in the broader food system. Plant breeding, as a field of research and practice, is uniquely well-suited to participatory project designs, since the basic process of observing and selecting plants for desirable traits is accessible to participants without formal plant breeding training. The challenge (...) for plant breeders engaged in participatory research is to consider not only how their work incorporates farmer input in developing new varieties, but also how it interacts with broader questions of food sovereignty, food justice, diversity and democratization in the food system. This article examines these issues in the context of the Seed to Kitchen Collaborative, a participatory variety evaluation and breeding project at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Cajal and Consciousness: Introduction. By PEDRO C. MARIJUAN1 -- Part I. Consciousness, One Hundred Years after Textura -- Progress in the Neural Sciences in the Century after Cajal (and the Mysteries -- That Remain). By THOMAS D. ALBRIGHT, THOMAS M. JESSELL, -- ERIC R. KANDEL, AND MICHAEL I. POSNER11 -- Part II. Biological Complexity and the Emergence of Consciousness -- Consciousness, Reduction, and Emergence: Some Remarks. -- By MURRAY GELL-MANN41 -- The Epistemic Paradox of Mind and (...) Matter. By HAROLD J. MOROWITZ50 -- The Conscious Cell. BY LYNN MARGULIS55 -- Complexity and Tinkering. By FRANCOIS JACOB71 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry. By STUART HAMEROFF. 74 -- Consciousness, the Brain, and Spacetime Geometry: An Addendum-Some -- New Developments on the Orch OR Model for Consciousness. -- By ROGER PENROSE105 -- Part III. From Primary to Higher-level Consciousness -- Consciousness: The Remembered Present. By GERALD EDELMAN111 -- Consciousness and the Binding Problem. By WOLF SINGER123 -- Cajal on Neurons, Molecules, and Consciousness. By JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX 147 -- A Neuronal Model of a Global Workspace in Effortful Cognitive Tasks. By -- STANISLAS DEHAENE, MICHEL KERSZBERG, AND JEAN-PIERRE -- CHANGEUX152 -- Consciousness and the Brain: The Thalamocortical Dialogue in Health and -- Disease. By RODOLFO LLINAS AND URS RIBARY166 -- The Neuroanatomy of Phenomenal Vision: A Psychological Perspective. -- ByPETRA STOERIG176 -- Co-evolution of Human Consciousness and Language. By MICHAEL A. ARBIB 195 -- From Computing with Numbers to Computing with Words-From -- Manipulation of Measurements to Manipulations of Perceptions. -- By LOTFI A. ZADEH221 -- Part IV. Closing Remarks -- Who Was Cajal? By ALBERTO PORTERA-SANCHEZ253 -- Index of Contributors259 -- Subject Index261. (shrink)

In addition to the notion of defeat, do we need to expand the epistemological repertoire used in accounting for the context dependence of justification? It has recently been argued that we ought to admit a hitherto unrecognized fundamental epistemic kind called ‘disqualifiers’. Disqualifiers are taken to be not reducible to any other epistemic notion. Rather, they are meant to be primitive. If this is correct, it is a surprising and novel discovery, and so it is worthy of further epistemological investigation. (...) In this paper I shall first argue that the cases given do not motivate positing the notion of a disqualifier. Conclusions drawn about the existence of disqualifiers do not follow from the considerations advanced. Second, I shall directly argue that an essential core claim of those who would posit disqualifiers, that so-called disqualifiers actually do prevent epistemic bases from conferring justification, is false. In sum, I shall argue that there are no disqualifiers. (shrink)

The missionary work of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika in theory and practice: in the past, present and futureIn this article a short survey is given of the missionary work, both in theory and practice, of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk during the last fifty years. There is also an indication that the Church has reached a crucial point which is going to require thorough rethinking and reconsideration of our missionary work.

According to Mark 6:14–29, John the Baptist was beheaded by the order of Herod Antipas. This dramatic event became inevitable after a cunning interplay between Herodias and her daughter, who remains nameless in the New Testament. According to Flavius Josephus, she was called Salome ( Jewish Antiquities XVIII, 5.4 § 136–137), and under that name, she went down in history. For the sake of convenience, I also call her ‘Salome’ in this article. Salome is the Greek form of the Hebrew (...) name Shlomith, which was very popular in early Judaic times and means ‘she who brings peace and tranquillity’. Unlike the faithful women elsewhere in Mark’s gospel (5:21–43; 7:24–30; 14:3–9), Herodias and her daughter are not exactly models of virtue. Yet, it is questionable as to whether they are both thoroughly bad and whether they are both equally responsible for the murder of John. This article does not provide a historical reconstruction of what exactly happened at the court of Herod Antipas, but it contains a narrative analysis of what happened in the court of Herod Antipas. This narrative analysis is followed by an intertextual approach in the second part of this article. Firstly, I will compare Mark’s story with what Flavius Josephus tells about the beheading of John. Thereafter, I will highlight the roles of Herodias and Salome in the play Salome by Oscar Wilde from 1894, which, in turn, forms the basis of the libretto for the opera Salome by Richard Strauss from 1905. Do we encounter in these modern artistic recreations (Neuschöpfungen) only transformations of Mark’s story, or also transgressions in which Wilde and Strauss have largely replaced the original meaning of the story with new meaning? (shrink)

A recent publication1 describes a novel mechanism by which a morphogen gradient might be established. These results concern a gradient of FGF8 expression along the longitudinal axis of the chick embryo with a high level of transcripts at the tail, fading off in an anterior direction. Assaying for intron transcripts, it is shown that fgf8 is transcribed only in the tail cells and that the gradient of fgf8 transcripts is produced by growth and mRNA degradation. This possible mechanism of gradient (...) formation can operate only when growth is involved, as is the case in many examples including the longitudinal axis formation of vertebrates, but is not in some other systems. BioEssays 26:705–706, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

We discuss an exact solution to the simplest nontrivial example of a geometrical phase in quantum mechanics. By means of this example: (1) we elucidate the fundamental distinction between rays and vectors in describing quantum mechanical states; (2) we show that superposition of quantal states is invalid; only decomposition is allowed—which is adequate for the measurement process. Our example also shows that the origin of singularities in the analog vector potential is to be found in the unavoidable breaking of projective (...) symmetry caused by using the Schrödinger equation. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic, and an account of consequence offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. This text presents what the authors term as 'logical pluralism' arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them.